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Abstract
The security industry operates within a diverse and multi-disciplined knowledge base, with
risk management as a fundamental knowledge domain within security to mitigate its risks.
Nevertheless, there has been limited research in understanding and mapping security expert
knowledge structures within security risk management to consider if parts of security risk
management are unique from more general risk management. This interpretive study applied
a technique of multidimensional scaling (MDS) to develop and present a psychometric map
within the knowledge domain of security risk management, validated with expert interviews.
The psychometric MDS security risk management concept map presented the expert
knowledge structure of security risk management, demonstrating the inclusive and spatial
locality of significant security risk concepts, conceptual complexity and uniqueness of the
domain and the importance of the concept threat. Understanding security experts’ consensual
knowledge of security risk may allow improved understanding of threat-based risk, the issue
with applying probabilistic risk analysis against antagonist events, and improved teaching and
learning within this knowledge domain.
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Introduction
Over the past two decades, the concept of risk management as a formal discipline has
emerged throughout the private and public sectors (Aven, 2008; Power, 2007). Risk
management has now become a well established discipline, with its own body of knowledge
and domain practitioners. States worldwide have their own risk management standards and in
many of these states, it is the senior company executives who have responsibility to ensure
that appropriate risk management practices meet internal and external compliance
requirements (D. J Brooks, 2009a). Nevertheless, many of these standards and compliance
requirements only consider risk management, not security risk management. Security risk
management may be considered unique from other forms of risk management, as many of the
more generic risk models lack key concepts necessary for effective design, application and
mitigation of security risks.
In general, security may be considered assured freedom from poverty or want, precautions
taken to ensure against theft, espionage, or a person or thing that secures or guarantees
(Angus & Roberston, 1992). According to Fischer and Green (Fischer & Green, 2004, p. 21)
“security implies a stable, relatively predictable environment in which an individual or group
may pursue its ends without disruption or harm and without fear of such disturbance or
injury.” Security practice areas may be considered public security (state policing), private
security, national security, private military security or many other terms, but convergence of
these areas are increasing in the current social and political environment. As Zedner stated
“scholars have tended to think about security within their immediate discipline and in
detachment from one another” (2009, p. 3). Such diversity may result in a society that has no
clear understanding of what security is, moreover, there is a divergence of interests from
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many stakeholders (Manunta, 1999). Nevertheless, the security industry incorporates diverse,
multi-disciplined and capricious practitioners, originating from many disciplines; however,
security risk management is a core skill for these security practitioners (D.J. Brooks, 2009b),
resulting in the importance of this type of study.
Background
World exposure to terrorist attacks in Mumbai (2009), Jakarta (2009; 2004), Glasgow (2007),
London (2007; 2006; 2005), Russia (2004), Spain (2004), Bali (2002) and New York (2001)
has raised social concern over the ability of governments to protection its citizens. The
previous Australian Prime Minister, Mr. John Howard, stated that the 2002 Bali attacks had
touched all Australians, resulting in Federal Government committing an additional
A$3.1billion to deal with the terrorist threat. The financial impact of the 11th September 2001
cost the United States 0.75 percent of US GDP or US$75 billion (Howard, 2004). These
issues have raised both national and international requirement for security that can effectively
protect its citizen at a reasonable cost, achieved to some degree through the use of security
risk management.
Within the context of this study, security was considered within a commercial, organisational
or private context for the protection of people, information and assets. This view was
supported by ASIS International (2000), when indicating that organisational security
management is a distinct field, separate from police or justice domains. Otherwise, with the
breadth of applied security domains, there could be a divergence of these distinct knowledge
categories.
Over the past two decades, the concept of risk management has flourished throughout the
private and public sectors (Aven, 2008; Power, 2007). Security, like other management
disciplines, has embraced the principles and application of risk management, in particular, a
probabilistic risk approach to measure risk and aid decision-making (Standards Australia,
2006; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). Such an approach has been supported by many, who view
probabilistic risk as a tool that produces rational, objective and informed options from which
decisions may be made (Garlick, 2007; Morgan & Henrion, 1990; Talbot & Jakeman, 2008).
However, many argue that probabilistic risk is inadequate for delivering (expected) rational
measurements of security risks in what may be considered an increasingly uncertain and
changing environment (Bier, 1999; Bier, 2007; L. A. Cox, 2008; Manunta, 2002).
Australia’s approach to security risk management
There are a number of risk management and security risk management frameworks used by
the Australian security industry including Australian Standard 4360:2004 Risk Management
(Standards Australia, 2004a), Handbook 167:2006 Security Risk Management (Standards
Australia, 2006) and the Risk Management Institute of Australasia Security Risk
Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK) (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008). Australian
Standard 4360:2004 has now been modified and used as the basis for the International
Standards Organisation ISO3100:2009 for risk management.
AS ISO 3100:2009 Risk Management
AS4360 Risk Management (Standards Australia, 2004a) was first published in 1992 and is
considered “almost a de facto global standard” (Jay, 2005, p. 2), becoming “recognised
internationally as best practice” (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 23) on dealing with risk, having
been used in Canada and the United Kingdom, and translated into Cantonese, Mandarin,
Japanese, Korean, French and Spanish (Jay, 2005, pp. 2-3). The standard is widely used by
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security professionals within Australia (Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 23) and became the draft for
the International Standards Organisation ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management (Standards
Australia, 2009, p. vi). Many industries use this framework and it has broad application
across governance, finance, engineering, project management, environmental protection, life
safety and security.
Standards Australia is Australia’s peak standards organisation, even though they are a public
company limited by guarantee. Standards Australia is charged by the Australian
Commonwealth Government to provide general oversight and governance of Australian
Standards (Standards Australia, n.d.), with four key areas of focus including national and
international coordination, accreditation of other organisations to produce standards,
development and update of standards, and design assessment (Standards Australia, 2009).
Australian Standards, as with most standards, are “published documents setting out
specifications and procedures designed to ensure products, services and systems are safe,
reliable and consistently perform” (Standards Australia, n.d. p. 2). Such an approach ensures
that a common language is achieved within an industry, driven by the more progressive parts
of industry, legislation and community expectations.
AS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management presents a framework (Figure 1) or process
(Standards Australia, 2009, p. vi) for the risk management process, beginning with
establishing the context, where the scope is set and stakeholders are identified. Next the risks
are assessed, integrating risk identification, analyses and evaluation, and finally risks are
treated. Concurrently with the risk assessment stages, the process is monitored and reviewed
and stakeholders are consulted (Standards Australia, 2004b).

Figure 1. Risk management.
(Standards Australia, 2004b; Standards Australia, 2009)
What the AS ISO 31000:2009 Risk Management standard does not consider are security risk
concepts such as threat, vulnerability and criticality, which could be considered significant.
Such limitations were addressed by Standards Australia when they developed, in consultation
with academia and the security industry, a specific security risk management standard,
namely Handbook HB167:2006 Security Risk Management.
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HB167:2006 Security Risk Management
As Standards Australia stated in their handbook of security risk management, “the field of
security risk management is rapidly evolving and as such this Handbook cannot cover all
aspects and variant approaches” (2004d, p. 2). As the security risk management concept map
has demonstrated, threat is a critical factor when considering security risk. However, the Risk
Management AS4360:2004 Standard does not present the concept of threat or other security
related concepts such as vulnerability, even through Risk Management AS4360:2004
Standard is a primary resource for security practitioners when considering and applying
security risk management.
HB167:2006 does “provide a means of better understanding the nature of security threats”
(Standards Australia, 2006, p. 6). For example, the handbook considers such security risk
concepts as threat, criticality and vulnerability (Figure 2); all significance and unique to this
domain of risk management (D. J Brooks, 2009a).

Figure 2. HB167:2006 Security risk management framework.
(Standards Australia, 2006, p. 14)
Other Security Related Australian Standards

4

Finally, within Standards Australia there are other specialised security risk related standards
covering areas such as business continuity management, health, information security,
outsourcing risk, finance and corporate governance (Table 1).
Table 1
Security related Australia Standards
Number
AS4485.1:1997
AS8000:2003
AS ISO/IEC27001:2005
HB141:1999
HB221:2003
HB240:2000
HB254:2005

Title
Security in health care facilities
Corporate governance
Information technology – Security requirements
Risk financing guidelines
Business continuity management
Guidelines for managing risk in outsourcing
Governance, risk management and control assurance

Whilst many of these frameworks have been developed in an attempt to account for risk
(Aven, 2008; Garlick, 2007), security, like many management disciplines has embraced a
probabilistic risk analysis approach (Manunta, 2002; Standards Australia, 2006; Talbot &
Jakeman, 2008). Based on a quantitative, semi-quantitative or qualitative assessment of the
probability and consequences of future events, probabilistic risk aims to provide security
managers with a measurement of such risks. Measurements are then used to formulate costeffective decisions to shape a future which (attempts to) minimise potential harm, whilst
captialising on potential opportunities (Garlick, 2007). Nevertheless, it can be suggested that
such a probabilistic approach does not provide risk management efficacy for security and
security risk management has to take a greater heuristic approach.
Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge
A framework that to some degree takes such a heuristic approach is the Risk Management
Institute of Australasia (RMIA) Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge (SRMBOK).
The need to increase security risk management knowledge was shown through an Australian
Federal Government supported initiative with the RMIA, resulting in the Security Risk
Management Body of Knowledge (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) guide for practitioners. The
guide attempts to resolve security risk management elements such as “a framework for
critical knowledge, competency and practice areas which managers, practitioners, students
and academics alike can apply to recruit, train, educate and measure performance” (Risk
Management Institute of Australasia, 2007b, p. 1). Nevertheless, the SRMBOK still does not
present clear identification of the many components and their interrelationships that could be
considered security risk management.
Significance of the study
The risk and security risk management frameworks presented provide a number of structures
or processes that practitioners may apply; however, they do not provide an in-depth
understanding of conceptual interrelationship between their parts. In addition, they do not
address how practitioners may or may not understand such relationships and whether such
frameworks are consensual in their approach. The psychometric MDS concept mapping
technique allowed such an understanding to be gained in security risk management. This
research allowed greater understanding of expert knowledge structure, improved security
education and curriculum design, and better development of the unique risk domain of
security risk management.
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Study objectives
The study used a psychometric technique to present a consensual concept map of security risk
management, with a number of discrete research questions, namely:
• What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security risk
management, as measured by multidimensional scaling?
• What is the expert knowledge structure and subordinate concepts of security risk
management, as measured by interviews?
• Can a psychometric multidimensional scaling concept map of the security risk
management knowledge structure and subordinate be developed and presented?
A number of significant outcomes from the study were expected. These outcomes included a
better understanding of the security risk management knowledge structure, with the more
significant security risk management knowledge concepts tabulated. Once these more
significant security risk management concepts were defined, a security risk management
knowledge and concept map could be developed.
Theoretical framework
A number of discrete theories supported the interpretive approach applied within the study,
including knowledge categorisation, concept mapping and multidimensional scaling (MDS).
These theories provided the inquiry with a scientific foundation. Knowledge categorisation
included cognitive memory, knowledge categorisation and expertise. Concept mapping and
MDS supported the development of security knowledge categorisation and subordinate
concept modelling.
Knowledge Categorisation
Knowledge may be considered as “facts or experiences known by a person or group of
people, specific information about a subject” (Angus & Roberston, 1992, p. 557). However,
according to Clancey, knowledge “is more than written scientific facts and theories” (1997, p.
285). Knowledge is not discovered, on the contrary, knowledge uses and expands existing
concepts (Novak, J.D. & Gowin, 1984) and is “a possible state of affairs, either real or
imaginary” (Eysenck & Keane, 2002, p. 533). As new knowledge is gained, change in
understanding regarding existing knowledge is achieved. Knowledge is viable (Rennie &
Gribble, 1999), constructed and is built on previous knowledge.
Knowledge is integral to memory structure – defined as the way in which memory is
organised, stores and retrieves information. The memory process has a major impact on the
ability of long term memory (LTM) to retain and retrieve (Eysenck & Keane, 2002) and is a
complex interactive process (Lockhart & Craik, 1990), which requires knowledge
categorisation. A person is exposed to information in their everyday life and concurrently
knowledge has to be economised and abstracted into categories, generally referred to as
concepts. Concepts may be further divided into implicit (inclusive) or explicit (concrete)
concepts. These concepts are developed and maintained within long-term memory, however
there is a cognitive balance between the number and effectiveness of possible concepts.
Concepts need to be informative, based to a degree on the natural world, economic and
cohesive (Eysenck & Keane, 2002) and organised into categories (Kellogg, 2003). Similar
objects are grouped together within a conceptual category and these groupings are generally a
product of the learner’s environment. There are four theories for concept categorisation,
being the defining-attribute, prototype, explanation and exemplar-based views (Eysenck &
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Keane, 2002). The exemplar based view was considered the informing theory supporting
knowledge categorisation.
Concept Mapping
Concept maps may be defined as a representation of a state of affair or situation. People may
attempt to understand the world though developing a concept map of the situation, an idea,
understanding or principle. Concept maps are thinking tools, that are used to explore different
aspects of a topic (Wallace, Schirato, & Bright, 1999). Concept maps are generally imaged,
dynamic and outcome-based simulations that are used in everyday life to think and
understand the world (Eysenck & Keane, 2002; Johnson-Laird, 1983; Norman, 1983).
Concept maps enable people to exchange an idea, have shared understanding, provide a
common language, reach conclusions in decision-making and guide their action (Norman,
1983; Novak, J.D. & Gowin, 1984). Concept maps may also be referred to as mental maps,
mind maps, naive theories or folk theories, although these are considered to have different
characteristics (Bennett & Rolheiser, 2001).
Concept maps attempt to present many aspects of human cognition, from direct
representation of a physical entity to abstract thought. This view supports concept
understanding as once a person understands the physical process, most will accept a formal
model of the process (Bar & Travis, 1991). Representation of abstract thought is far less
defined and involves implicit knowledge, although these models will “represent aspects of
external reality” (Borges & Gilbert, 1999, p. 96). According to Eysenck and Keane (2002),
people will often make discoveries using concept models to simulate aspects of the world, an
ability that appears to depend on domain specific knowledge based on experience.
Concept maps may take many forms, however within the context of this study they are
defined as graphical representations of structured knowledge. According to Novak and
Gowin, concept maps are a “schematic device for representing a set of concept meanings
embedded in a framework of propositions” (1984, p. 15). The schema may be as a body of
knowledge, being the summation of domain experts understanding of their knowledge
structure at that point in time (Trochim, 2005b), or as an individual and how a concept map
may represent their understanding. Experts tend to define their knowledge within concept
clusters, which are more extensive, have greater cross concept linkage, increased branches,
greater hierarchical structure and are more complex (Markham, Mintzes, & Jones, 1994).
There are many methods to develop concept maps, with an enormity of variations that may
extract, develop and represent concept maps (Ruiz-Primo, Schultz, Li, & Shavelson, 2001).
According to Johnson-Laird (1983), concept maps may be divided into two distinct types,
namely physical or conceptual maps. Physical maps provide representation of physical
systems and research has tended to focus on physical objects, particularly in chemistry,
physics and biology domains (Johnson-Laird, 1983; J. D. Novak, 1998), whereas conceptual
maps represent abstract or inclusive knowledge categorisation (Eysenck & Keane, 2002;
Reisberg, 2001). The study used both quantitative and qualitative techniques to extract and
present a conceptual psychometric concept map of security risk management.
Multidimensional Scaling
Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is a statistical technique within the area of multivariate
analysis. MDS reduces complex n-dimensional data and represents these data within a spatial
format. The reduction in data complexity through presentation in n-dimensional space allows
hidden data structure formation — demonstrating object proximity — with proximity being
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how similar or dissimilar objects are perceived to be (T. F. Cox & Cox, 2000; Kruskal &
Wish, 1978). MDS commences with a set of objects, which are paired and their similarities
measured. The distance between pairs of objects are placed into a half matrix format.
Configurations of points are sought in n-dimensional space, with each point representing an
object. MDS calculates n-dimensional space configuration where the points distance match
the paired dissimilarities. The variation in matching defines the different techniques of MDS
(T. F. Cox & Cox, 2000), with the study using the ALSCAL algorithm:
½

𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿𝛿 = �� (𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳 − 𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳𝒳)
𝑖𝑖
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�

MDS provided a suitable tool (Smith, 2003) to categorise knowledge concept clusters within
n dimensions. This method is supported by Ohanian (cited in Stein, 1997), whom stated that
expertise can be measured as a construct that contains multiple dimensions. MDS facilitated
the construction of the security consensual map. MDS produced a spatial representation of
knowledge concept clusters, allowing an analysis of judgements between variables to define
dimensionality between such variables (Cohen, Manion, & Morrison, 2002). MDS also
provides a moderate to good construct validity for concept mapping (Hoz, Bowman, &
Chacham, 1997, p. 928).
The use of MDS in concept mapping was first presented by Trochim (1989b), with later work
that expanded and detailed the methodology of constructing and presenting concept maps
(Trochim & Cook, 1994). Nevertheless, Trochim’s (1989b) earlier work considered only
knowledge structure, a rather restricted approach that contradicted the view of concept
mapping (1990) and which continued to more recent work (Trochim, 2005b). During this
period Markham, et al. (1994) used MDS as a method to test the validity of concept mapping,
considering the previous work by Novak (1990). Markham, et al. (1994) demonstrated that
concept mapping provided a theoretically valid and powerful tool, and that MDS proved an
appropriate statistical technique to define concept maps. A view that more recent researchers
have validated, through additional MDS concept mapping studies (Ruiz-Primo et al., 2001;
Streveler, Miller, & Boyd, 2001).
Published literature have integrated both concept mapping and MDS, which included studies
that considered a scientific method to design a teaching methodology used in basic signal
processing (Martinez-Torres, Garcia, Marin, & Vazquez, 2005), the spatial variation of
species diversity (Cheng, 2004), techniques used by physiotherapists in Southeast Australia
(Turner, 2002) and computer-based collaborative learning environments (Kealy, 2001). These
studies have lead to the general conclusion that psychometric MDS concept mapping presents
valid and robust concept maps.
Study design
The study was divided into three distinct phases (Table 2), designed to respond to the three
research questions.
Table 2
Study design
Phase
One

Description
Knowledge categorisation

Outcome
Extracted list of security risk concepts
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Two
Three

MDS knowledge structure
Expert knowledge structure validation

Knowledge structure of security risk
Concept map of security risk

Phase one: Knowledge categorisation
The study commenced with Phase one and knowledge categorisation, where 104 English
speaking institutions that offered tertiary security courses at undergraduate or postgraduate
level were investigated and critiqued. Search methods to identify these courses used the
world-wide-web, ASIS International (2007), Security Institute (Kidd, 2006), Australian
University Guide (Good Guides, 2004) and Association of Universities and Colleges of
Canada (2005). There was no limitation placed on the search criteria, as all institutions that
offered security and allied industry courses were assessed (Table 3). In the world-wide-web
search engines, typical data strings used were security; security course; security
management.
Table 3
Location and number of security related courses
Country of origin
Australia
Canada
United Kingdom
United States of America
New Zealand
South Africa
Total

Institutions offering security related courses
11
8
5
74
5
1
104

Initial course selection was based on course title, supported by three industry and academic
security experts. Further analysis reduced the number of courses to seven for content
analysis. Once the final seven courses were selected for content analysis, course syllabi were
sourced. Course syllabi included the course overview, and unit of study descriptions,
objectives and content overview. Concept extraction commenced with an initial analysis of
each critiqued course. Course structures were analysed for security and risk concepts,
extracted using Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) text and content analysis
(Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001). Course transcripts were sanitised, as generic study or
research skills were not considered within the content analysis.
Initial analysis resulted in 56 security risk concepts being extracted; however, the most used
security risk concepts were required for knowledge mapping. Therefore, further analysis was
undertaken and considered such aspects as word frequency, context and locality. In addition,
convergence was applied using the Australian Risk Management Standard AS4360:2004
(Standards Australia, 2004a), now ISO 3100:2009. Analysis resulted in a final security risk
management category, with supporting subordinate concepts (Table 4).
Table 4
Risk management category and subordinate concepts

Analysis
Communication
Decision
Risk management

Security risk management
Assessment
Consequence
Evaluation
Perception
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Calculate
Culture
Loss
Probability

Risk

Threat

Phase two: Multidimensional scaling knowledge structure
The second phase developed the multidimensional scaling (MDS) psychometric knowledge
map of the security risk experts. To achieve this outcome, a number of steps were taken to
analyse and present the security risk management knowledge map (Figure 3).

Figure 3. Psychometric MDS concept mapping methodology
Phase one data was inserted into the study’s survey instrument (see Figure 4 for a sample),
embedded with the 14 security knowledge categories (Table 3). Participants selected, on a
sliding scale, how similar or dissimilar they considered pairs of these security risk concepts.
Non-probabilistic selected expert participants (N=29) made up the study’s sampling group.
The sample size was selected to reduce the MDS STRESS1 measure (Cheng, 2004, p. 340;
Cohen et al., 2002), but not exceeded due to the non-probability sampling method applied to
expert selection.
when compared to
Similar 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Dissimilar
Analysis
Assessment
Analysis
Calculate
Analysis
Communication
Analysis
Consequence
Analysis
Culture
etc
etc

Figure 4. Example of the MDS survey instrument
The security risk management experts were selected by non-probability sampling and based
on the study’s definition of expertise. As people gain domain knowledge, they may become
more expert. Nevertheless expertise is not the exclusive gathering of information, moreover a
rich understanding of knowledge, how that knowledge integrates into concepts and
experience (Kellogg, 2003). Experts, unlike novice learners, understand domain knowledge
in a hierarchical manner and have a more complex schema. This knowledge categorisation
can be represented with concept maps, showing rich knowledge structure (Markham et al.,
1994).
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For the study an initial number of Australian experts were sourced, based on their known
standing in the security risk management community. Each expert was asked to recommend
additional leading security risk management practitioners or academics. From the peer
recommendations, these additional experts were contacted until the proposed study sampling
size was attained. On contact, each expert was given a synopsis of the study and requested
that they participate in the MDS concept mapping survey. The MDS survey was administered
to the experts via a number of methods, dependant on geographical location of the expert
from the researcher.
Data was extracted from the sum of the experts’ MDS survey instrument responses
(Cronbach’s Alpha α0.93), converted into a half-matrix and analysed using MDS. MDS
ALSCAL analysis (STRESS1=0.28, RSQ=0.64) produced the spatial map (Figure 5), which
required rotation and insertion of propositional statements.

Figure 5. Psychometric security risk management knowledge structure
Notes: (comms = communications; cultrisk = cultural risk; intell = intelligence; psycho = perception; stats =
statistics)

The psychometric security risk structure (Figure 5) had both dimensional x and y axis data
removed, leaving only knowledge structure (Figure 6). The structure was also rotated
approximately 35°, locating the concept risk upper most as the most implicit concept.
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Figure 6. MDS concept knowledge structure ready for propositional linkage insertion
At this point, the MDS knowledge structure (Figure 6) was presented to experts (N=5) using
a Delphi method. Each expert inserted propositional concept map links and labels in isolation
to each other. Once this initial process was completed, the sum of the experts’ results was
compared and only consensual links and labels retained. The process was then repeated until
any subsequent changes were minimal or not supported by a consensus. Such a process led to
the draft security risk management map, which was further validated in the following Phase
three.
Phase three: Expert knowledge structure validation
Phase three used expert interviews (N=6) to assess the validity of the draft security risk
management map. An expert interview survey instrument was developed to analyse and
interpret the opinions of the experts regarding such aspects as the security risk map structure,
inclusivity of security risk concepts and concept propositions. To complete the study, a
comparative stage to triangulate (Cohen et al., 2002, pp. 112-115) between Phase one and
Phase two outcomes followed, where the appropriateness of the MDS security risk
management consensual map (Figure 7) was considered.
Psychometric map of security risk management
The study presented the psychometric security risk management map (Figure 7), which
resulted in a number of interesting interpretations. Such interpretations included the central
locality of the concept threat, the clustering of psychology risk concepts to threat, the
outlying of risk assessment concepts such as probability and consequence, and the experts’
view that security risk management provided a quantitative analysis.
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risk
are managed through

requires

risk
management
requires

assessment

is part of

calculate
evaluation
requires

defines
defines

culture

influences

can influence
awareness of

communication

is required
to control

perception
can influence
awareness of

threat

probalility
is measured with
may result in

consequence
defines potential
defined with

analysis
defines

loss
decision
requires a

Figure 7. Psychometric security risk management concept map
The psychometric security map presented threat at the spatial centre of the map, indicating
that this concept is most related to the other measured concepts; a locality that was strongly
supported by the Phase three experts. As one of the experts stated, “if there is no threat then
there is no risk”, supported by another who proposed that “threat is a fundamental that drives
[security] risk”. Such locality raised a number of issues, one being that for many years
AS4360 risk management standard was the primary source for security practitioners and
threat is not considered in this standard. Nevertheless, this issue has been addressed in 2006
with the introduction of the Security Risk Management HB167:2006 handbook (Standards
Australia, 2006).
According to the map, threat also has a close relationship to both perception and culture.
Such relationship considers that to some degree organisational background will define the
level of perception to threat based on the cultural acceptability. In other words, that both
perception and culture informs the level of threat that an individual, organisation, community
or society will be willing to accept or not. As McGill, et al., states, “the threat component …
is arguably the most uncertain aspect of the security risk problem” (2007, p. 1266), requiring
subjective assumptions to forecast the intentions of potential adversaries. If threat is so
uncertain, then its drivers of perception and cultural further complicates this issue.
Many of the security risk management frameworks put forward in the introduction included
the concepts of probability and consequence (Standards Australia, 2004a; Standards
Australia, 2006). However, the security risk map presented these two concepts as relative
outliers and not where one may expect these concepts to be located. A number of the
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interviewed experts’ did raise this issue and suggested that these two concepts should be
closer to analysis. The concept cluster of risk management, calculate, assessment and
evaluation appears to indicate that the experts’ viewed security risk management as providing
a quantitative or probabilistic analysis. Nevertheless, the participating experts all agreed that
in general the two concepts of probability and consequence were suitably located. It may be
suggested that experts’ consider the importance of threat and have some implicit
understanding that these concepts cannot necessarily provide a wholly suitable measure. Cox
suggests that by taking such a probabilities approach to assessing the action of intelligent
antagonist may lead to errors in risk estimates (L. A. Cox, 2008, p. 1749).
The study appeared to demonstrate a number of significant findings. These supported the
research questions, with evidence to suggest that for the security risk management category:
• MDS represented an appropriate technique to provide structure in the foundation of
consensual knowledge maps.
• Within the psychometric security risk map, the spatial localities of concepts provided an
indication of conceptual interrelationships and relationships.
• An appropriate consensual psychometric map of the security risk category and supporting
subordinate concepts was presented (Figure 7).
The security risk map structure, spatial representation and inclusion of the more significant
security risk concepts provided evidence that the psychometric security risk management map
appeared to represent an appropriate knowledge structure for the security category of risk
management, strongly supported by the participating security experts.

Recommendations
The study outcomes lead to a series of recommendations in how the psychometric security
risk management map informs understanding of security risk management and directs further
inquiry. These recommendations suggest how the psychometric security risk management
concept map may benefit both academia and professional understanding of security risk
management including a greater understanding of expert knowledge structure, assist in
developing a security body of knowledge, improved security directed pedagogy, better
development of the unique risk domain of security risk management and security risk
management application
Benefit of the psychometric security risk management concept map
Security lacks definition (Tate, 1997) and yet is a distinct field of practice and study (ASIS
International, 2003b; D.J. Brooks, 2009b). Supported by professional security bodies such as
Risk Management Institute of Australasia (RMIA) (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) and ASIS
International (2009), security risk management is a unique knowledge category of security.
Nevertheless, the security industry is a diverse and a speciality industry that has a
requirement for both generic and domain specific skills (Hesse & Smith, 2001; Manunta,
1996) and being a relatively young and emerging discipline, continues to expand (Fischer &
Green, 2004; Tate, 1997).
Risk management, as proposed by AS ISO 3100:2009, has been the primary methodological
approach for security practitioners. In the past, the predecessor of AS ISO 31000:2009 was
often considered “almost a de facto global standard” (Jay, 2005, p. 2) and has become an
international template on dealing with risk. AS4360:2004 was used in diverse disciplines,
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from finance to engineering and is used extensively by security and risk professionals across
Australia (Beard & Brooks, 2006, p. 5; Jones & Smith, 2005, p. 2).
As Standards Australia suggested in their handbook of security risk management, “the field
of security risk management is rapidly evolving and as such this Handbook cannot cover all
aspects and variant approaches” (2004d, p. 2). As the security risk management concept map
has demonstrated, threat is a critical factor when considering security risk; however, AS ISO
31000:2009 does not present the concept of threat or other security related concepts like
vulnerability, even through this standard still remains a primary resource for security
practitioners when considering and applying security risk management.
The need to increase knowledge of security risk management can be shown through an
Australian Federal Government supported initiative with the RMIA. These groups, among
others, developed and in 2007 published the Security Risk Management Body of Knowledge
SRBOK) guide for practitioners. The guide attempts to resolve security risk management
elements such as “a framework for critical knowledge, competency and practice areas which
managers, practitioners, students and academics alike can apply to recruit, train, educate and
measure performance” (Risk Management Institute of Australasia, 2007b, p. 1).
Most corporate security courses have been developed from related disciplines, being police,
justice or criminology studies (Smith, 2001b; Tate, 1997), even through according to ASIS
these disciplines should be separate and discrete from security (2003a, p. 4). At the tertiary
level there is a lack of academic security programs, with most focused on criminal justice,
crime prevention or risk management (Jay, 2005; Manunta, 1996, p. 235). This distortion of
the corporate security discipline will result in security research that is not necessarily
appropriate for the security industry. Security “is not merely a matter of intuition or common
sense: it involves a complex body of knowledge, analytical abilities and know-how”
(Simonsen, 1996, p. 229).
Nevertheless, according to Smith, security knowledge is being established though the
development of appropriate domain concepts (2001a, p. 32), which is supported by Simonsen
who stated that the “body of knowledge of security has grown rapidly in the past decade”
(1996, p. 230). Security risk management is one such knowledge category that is core to the
corporate security discipline (D.J. Brooks, 2009b). The security risk management concept
map provides a degree of specialised security body of knowledge. Understanding the risk and
security risk management concepts that security experts consider when assessing security
risk, how these concepts relate and integrate, and why security experts consider these ideas
all support understanding.
Further research
The study has lead to the need for greater research in certain aspects of security risk
management. It is important to further validate the importance of the concept threat within
security risk management. For example, is this concept the core driver when completing
security risk management, as opposed to more general risk management?
The study used and measured the concept probability, as opposed to likelihood. The rationale
behind the use of probability over likelihood was driven by the study’s methodology in
Phases one and two i.e., probability was a more used concept. Nevertheless, some view
likelihood (Standards Australia, 2004d) as being a more relevant concept for security risk
management due to greater qualitative cogitation. Further measurement of the relationship
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between these two concepts would be appropriate. In addition, the importance of
vulnerability needs to be considered.
The conceptual relationships put forward by the Australian Handbook (Standards Australia,
2004c) and RMIA (Talbot & Jakeman, 2008) for Threat Assessment, Vulnerability
Assessment and Criticality Assessment requires greater understanding. As this study has put
forward, threat is a central and core concept for security risk management. Does this add
greater weight in important to Threat Assessments, what is more or less important when
considering security risk management and when considering Criticality Assessment, is
criticality better understood and therefore managed as this may better relate to security
consequence?
Finally, the ability to validate the psychometric security risk management map needs to
consider the study limitations. Further research could address this study’s limitations through
aspects such as a greater sample size or by applying a different methodological approach.
Methodological implications
Methodological limitations of the study were identified and included the ability to provide a
conclusive definition of security, missing concept of vulnerability, sample size and extracted
data, the ability of multidimensional scaling (MDS) to develop cognitive knowledge
structure, and the reliability and validity of the study.
Defining security and its concepts
A total of 104 tertiary security courses were selected and validated by security experts;
however, security has no clear definition (Horvath, 2004; Manunta, 1999; Tate, 1997) and
“means different things to different people” (Davidson, 2005, p. 73). According to Hesse and
Smith, security is diverse, without a defined knowledge or skill structure (2001, p. 89). A
view put forward by Brooks, who suggest that security can only be defined through
contextual understanding (D.J. Brooks, 2009b). Therefore, homogeneity in the selection and
validation of expert groups within the study may have introduced some degree of distortion.
To address this concern independent resources were used for data triangulation, for example
the ASIS International Academic/Practitioner Symposiums (ASIS International, 2003b; ASIS
International, 2009).
In considering the security risk management category, an additional subordinate concept of
vulnerability could have been included in the psychometric map. Expert opinion indicated
that this concept was a relatively important idea within security risk management. Such a
view could also be suggested for the concept likelihood. Nevertheless, during study Phase
one this concept was not identified and resulted in its exclusion. Therefore, the security risk
management concept map has to be considered in the context of the homogeneity of the
critiqued courses and expert validation groups.
Sample size and course nature
The study critiqued 104 tertiary security courses, resulting in a final analysis of seven
courses. Since this critique there has been an increase in security undergraduate course
offerings, with a claim that in the United States there are now “more than 300 two and fouryear institutions that participate with homeland security programs” (Davidson, 2005, p. 72).
However, it could be argued that these may not necessarily be appropriate organisational
security undergraduate courses.
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For greater statistical confidence, the sample study size could have been larger. In addition,
due to the non-probabilistic sampling approach, homogeneity of study participants and
experts could have been experienced. Both factors may have resulted in some degree of error
in the psychometric security risk management concept map. But in another MDS concept
mapping study on reliability (Trochim, 1993) an average of 14.62 participants were used,
with the conclusion that MDS “sample sizes half as large are nearly as good as the full-size
values, suggesting that even smaller samples … may produce maps that fit almost as well as
samples twice as large” (Trochim, 1993, p. 11). Therefore based on the supporting MDS
knowledge mapping evidence and with the need to gain an appropriately valid MDS sample
size, in general the sample sizes were considered appropriate. Nevertheless, conclusions
made have to be considered within the context of the sample size, nature of non-probabilistic
sampling and homogeneity.
Cognitive knowledge structuring
The study has demonstrated that an appropriate expert knowledge structure of security risk
management can be presented; however, knowledge is dynamic, complex and implicit
(Lockhart & Craik, 1990; Rennie & Gribble, 1999). Exemplar knowledge categorisation,
indicates that concepts have relationship attributes based on similarity (Cohen et al., 2002,
pp. 294-295). Nevertheless, the ability of proximal data to represent knowledge structure has
been criticised, both in its ability to represent cognitive structure and to provide useful
pedagogy information (Smith, 1984, p. 254).
Reliability and validity of MDS concept mapping
Reliability and validity were considered throughout the study, cognizant of the relatively high
MDS goodness-of-fit (STRESS1) measure, although Cronbach’s Alpha reliability (α0.93),
face and concurrent validity, and study triangulation all proved robust. MDS STRESS1 is a
suitable MDS concept mapping measure — if a map achieved a value of less than 0.1
(Johnson & Wichern, 2002, p. 702) — of both reliability and validity. However this study,
achieved what Johnson and Wichern would consider an inappropriately high STRESS1
(STRESS1=0.28, RSQ=0.64) measure. Nevertheless, this measure replicated findings of a
similar larger MDS concept study (Trochim, 1993). In addition, Kealy (2001, p. 338)
presented even higher STRESS1 results (STRESS1=0.36 to 0.35), with many other relevant
MDS concept mapping studies not reporting their MDS goodness-of-fit measures (Lockhart
& Craik, 1990; Markham et al., 1994; Martinez-Torres et al., 2005). Therefore, this study’s
STRESS1 was considered suitable, support from comparable MDS concept mapping studies.
Conclusion
Risk management and security risk management have flourished over the past decade and are
relied upon to provide robust and informed mitigation strategies to protect people,
information and assets. However, most risk management standards provide a framework or
process that takes a probabilistic approach to risk management, perhaps not wholly suitable
for security. This article has presented many of the Australian approaches to risk and security
risk management, such as the ISO 31000:2009 risk management standard, Handbook
AS436:2006 and the RMIA SRMBOK. Nevertheless, these frameworks or processes do not
necessarily provide an in-depth understanding to security risk management and its uniqueness
from risk management.
Using an interpretive approach with the foundation theories of knowledge categorisation,
concept mapping and multidimensional scaling (MDS), this study has presented an experts’
consensual psychometric map of security risk management. The study was divided into three
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distinct phases, each informing the proceeding phase. The first phase critiqued 104 security
courses and from these, tabulated the most subordinate security risk management concepts
(N=14). These concepts were embedded into the MDS instrument to produce the spatial
psychometric knowledge structure of security risk management, from which the final security
risk management concept map was developed.
The psychometric security risk management map (Figure 7) presented a number of interesting
aspects, such as the central locality of threat, the clustering of psychology risk concepts and
the interrelationship of probabilistic analysis to security risk management. Threat was
fundamental to security risk management, driven by an individual’s perception and the
organisational culture. Probability, consequence and analysis were clustered together and
remote from the other general risk concepts, indicating that such a quantitative or
probabilistic approach to security risk management may not be wholly suitable.
The psychometric security risk management map was developed and tested at every stage of
the study, with indications that it was both reliable and valid. Such a map will benefit
academia and industry understanding of security risk management, leading to improved
frameworks, processes, teaching and learning. The map has shown the uniqueness of security
risk management to risk management and augmented implicit understanding of experts in this
complex risk domain.
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